Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'works' and 'Semantic Relationism'

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27 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
21945 Foucault originally felt that liberating reason had become an instrument of domination [Foucault, by Gutting]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
15592 The usual Tarskian interpretation of variables is to specify their range of values [Fine,K]
15593 Variables can be viewed as special terms - functions taking assignments into individuals [Fine,K]
15590 It seemed that Frege gave the syntax for variables, and Tarski the semantics, and that was that [Fine,K]
15591 In separate expressions variables seem identical in role, but in the same expression they aren't [Fine,K]
15595 The 'algebraic' account of variables reduces quantification to the algebra of its component parts [Fine,K]
15594 'Instantial' accounts of variables say we grasp arbitrary instances from their use in quantification [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
15599 Cicero/Cicero and Cicero/Tully may differ in relationship, despite being semantically the same [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
15603 I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
15604 If Cicero=Tully refers to the man twice, then surely Cicero=Cicero does as well? [Fine,K]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
21942 Foucault challenges knowledge in psychology and sociology, not in the basic sciences [Foucault, by Gutting]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
21941 Unlike Marxists, Foucault explains thought internally, without deference to conscious ideas [Foucault, by Gutting]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
15602 Mental files are devices for keeping track of basic coordination of objects [Fine,K]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
15588 You cannot determine the full content from a thought's intrinsic character, as relations are involved [Fine,K]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
20949 Study the use of words, not their origins [Herder]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
15596 The standard aim of semantics is to assign a semantic value to each expression [Fine,K]
15587 That two utterances say the same thing may not be intrinsic to them, but involve their relationships [Fine,K]
15589 The two main theories are Holism (which is inferential), and Representational (which is atomistic) [Fine,K]
15598 We should pursue semantic facts as stated by truths in theories (and not put the theories first!) [Fine,K]
15600 Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives [Fine,K]
15601 Fregeans approach the world through sense, Referentialists through reference [Fine,K]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
15605 I take indexicals such as 'this' and 'that' to be linked to some associated demonstration [Fine,K]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / b. Literature
21939 The author function of any text is a plurality of selves [Foucault, by Gutting]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
7669 We cannot attain all the ideals of every culture, so there cannot be a perfect life [Herder, by Berlin]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
21940 Nature is not the basis of rights, but the willingness to risk death in asserting them [Foucault]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
7668 Herder invented the idea of being rooted in (or cut off from) a home or a group [Herder, by Berlin]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / d. Reform of offenders
21116 Power is used to create identities and ways of life for other people [Foucault, by Shorten]